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Focus on Military and Veterans Law
by Hillary A. Wandler

Extended Exposure: Advising Veterans of Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction Over In-Service Conduct
On June 4, 2014, former U.S. Marine Corporal
Wilfredo Santiago was convicted of making false statements to
investigators about his involvement in an accidental, non-fatal
shooting of Navy Hospital Corpsman Michael John Carpeso in Iraq.1
The shooting occurred more than six years before Santiago was
convicted and almost five years before he was indicted.
Santiago was still in the Marine Corps then, finishing his third
tour of duty in Iraq. After first denying involvement in the shooting,
he eventually admitted his M9 pistol fired while he was clearing it,
sending a bullet into the Navy corpsman’s temple.2 Santiago was
not court martialed after his admission, even though Naval Criminal
Investigative Services (NCIS) fully investigated the incident while
he was still in active service.
When Santiago’s active service was terminated, he remained a
reservist until 2011, when he was honorably discharged from the
Marine Corps.3 This cut off the military’s jurisdiction to prosecute
him for the shooting under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.4
Because the shooting happened while Santiago was on foreign soil,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) also lacked jurisdiction to charge
him. That left only one option: a statute allowing prosecution of
a former member of the armed forces for an offense committed
outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction—the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA). Asserting jurisdiction under
MEJA, the U.S. Attorney’s Office indicted Santiago in the Southern
District of New York in January 2013.5
Prosecutions under MEJA were not new. Between 2005 and
2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) had referred 100 cases to
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for prosecution under MEJA,6 including
some of the most noteworthy indictments and convictions under
the act. These included the indictments against civilian security
guards working for the Department of State contractor Blackwater

Worldwide for the shooting in Baghdad’s Nisur Square and the
conviction of former Army Private Steven Green for the noncombat
rape and murder of Iraqi civilians.7
But the nature of Santiago’s prosecution, which involved an
honorably discharged service member whose conduct was known
and fully investigated while he could be court martialed, has caused
some to seriously question MEJA’s continued use against former
service members. Southern District of New York Judge Colleen
McMahon said that civilian jurisdiction over former service members outside the reach of court martial “came as a great surprise” to
her. “[T]his law was not passed to cover the Wilfredo Santiagos of
this world,” Judge McMahon stated, “and its use in this context is
fraught with the possibility for mischief.”8 For veterans’ advocates
focused primarily on disability compensation, a client's extended
exposure to criminal prosecution under MEJA could be equally as
unexpected.

The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 was primarily crafted to establish federal criminal jurisdiction over civilians
employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside of the
United States.9 This includes (1) civilian employees, (2) contractors and subcontractors, and (3) employees of contractors and
subcontractors.10 Dependents of members of the armed forces and
those “employed by the Armed Forces” also fall under the act’s
jurisdiction.11
The act amended Title 18 of the U.S. Code, not by adding new
sections to the crimes covered there, but by establishing jurisdiction
over offenses committed outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction. It targeted conduct that would have been punishable under the Title 18
Crimes section by imprisonment for more than one year had it been
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committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.”12
The act also extended federal criminal jurisdiction to former
service members. First, a member of the armed forces may be
prosecuted under the act if that person is no longer subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Second, a member of the
armed forces who is still subject to the UCMJ may be prosecuted
under the act if at least one co-defendant is not subject to the UCMJ.
In either case, the act does not disturb a military tribunal’s concurrent jurisdiction.13
Although foreign governments rarely prosecute U.S. citizens for
crimes committed on their soil, if a foreign government chose to
exercise jurisdiction, the act may preclude prosecution for the same
conduct in U.S. courts. In that circumstance, if the United States
recognizes the foreign government’s jurisdiction, prosecution in
U.S. courts may proceed only if the attorney general approves the
prosecution.14
The act authorizes DOD law enforcement officers to arrest a
suspect based on probable cause. Once arrested, the accused must
be handed over to U.S. civilian law enforcement “as soon as practicable.”15 Finally, even when civilian law enforcement authorities
take custody of the accused, they cannot immediately remove the
accused to the United States or any other foreign country without
action by a federal magistrate, the Secretary of Defense, or the
accused.16
A federal magistrate may appoint “qualified military counsel.”17
All initial proceedings, including arrest, detention, delivery, and
removal, are governed by DOD regulations.18
The act encourages notice to foreign nationals who may be
subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction due to their work with the U.S.
armed forces.19 However, it does not require or encourage notice to
members of the armed forces about the potential for post-discharge
criminal prosecution in civilian courts.

Legislative Intent
As Judge McMahon noted, “This law was not passed to cover the
Wilfredo Santiagos of this world.”20 Proponents of the act focused
almost exclusively on American civilians. In the House report
accompanying H.R. 3380, the Committee on the Judiciary described
a “jurisdictional gap” that allowed crimes committed by American
civilians—examples included sexual assault, arson, robbery, larceny,
embezzlement, and fraud—to “go unpunished” when committed
overseas. According to the committee, the gap was created because
U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes and the
foreign country in which the crimes were committed declined to
exercise its jurisdiction “when an American [was] the victim or when
the crime involv[ed] only property owned by Americans.”21
The report discussed how civilians employed by or accompanying the armed forces overseas were originally subject to prosecution
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.22 However, after a series
of U.S. Supreme Court cases limited the code’s reach over civilians
to times of congressionally declared war, the only remaining authority with jurisdiction over civilian crimes committed overseas was the
foreign government of the country in which the crime was committed. Because foreign governments often waived their jurisdiction
and chose to not prosecute American civilians, particularly when
no person or property from the foreign country suffered damage in
the crime, many crimes committed by civilians went unpunished.23

Although the United States could bar the civilian perpetrator from
its overseas military installations or terminate any contract it had
with the individual, it had no ability to prosecute the individual
using existing U.S. criminal statutes, which applied only to crimes
committed within U.S. borders.24
The committee asserted the U.S. government had two moral justifications for punishing crimes committed by civilians employed by
and accompanying the military overseas. First, but for the military’s
presence in the foreign country, the civilian employees and dependents would not be there. Because the military’s presence in the
foreign country was a factor that made these crimes possible, the
committee asserted the government had a clear interest in punishing the civilians who committed the crimes. Second, the committee
found the government was morally justified in using U.S. law to punish anyone who harmed an American victim or property.25
In addition to these moral justifications for the act, the committee noted the practical consequences of allowing civilian crimes
committed overseas to go unpunished. Robert E. Reed, DOD associate deputy general counsel, noted negative consequences the
military had already experienced and anticipated could still develop
from allowing civilian crime to go unpunished. These included
decreased deterrence, morale, and discipline in the overseas
military community; “the strong potential for embarrassment in the
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international community”; expected increase in hostility in local
communities where the military was stationed; and the potential for
damaged relationships between the United States and its allies.26 In
the same hearing, Roger Pauley of the Department of Justice noted
that in some recent peacekeeping missions, foreign host nations had
been reluctant to enter into agreements that would cede jurisdiction over U.S. civilians in the country with the military “because of
awareness that the United States lack[ed] statutory mechanisms to
exercise such jurisdiction.”27

military forces overseas.”32 Testifying in support of the act in 2000,
Assistant Judge Advocate General for the Army Joseph R. Barnes
confirmed nearly the same point about more modern contingency
operations: “It is not unusual … for the number of civilians accompanying U.S. forces to actually outnumber the number of military
personnel engaged in that operation.”33
After 2000, the civilian presence with deployed armed forces
once again became significant. Although the number of civilian contractors in Iraq was not always clear in Operation Iraqi Freedom,34

While the number of DOD civilian contractors overseas has been steadily declining since 2008,
the percentage of civilians in the United States’ deployed force remains significant—enough of a
presence to justify vigorous enforcement of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over civilians.
Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio) spoke in support of H.R. 3380,
asserting: “This bill fills the jurisdiction gap in the law that has
allowed rapists, child molesters, and a variety of other criminals
to escape punishment for their crimes.”28 Sen. Saxby Chambliss
(R-Ga.) also spoke in support of the bill, providing several examples
of crimes that had gone unpunished because of the jurisdictional
gap, all of which were committed by civilians:
Let me give you just a couple of examples of the problem
our military faces. In one instance, a Department of Defense
teacher raped a minor and videotaped the event. The host
country chose not to prosecute, and our government did not
have jurisdiction to prosecute the teacher.
In another case, the son of a contract employee in Italy committed various crimes, including rape, arson, assault, and
drug trafficking. Again, because of a lack of jurisdiction to
prosecute, as a punishment for these criminal acts the son
could only be barred from the base.
Finally, an Air Force employee molested 24 children ages 9 to
14. However, because the host country refused to prosecute,
the only recourse was again to bar this individual from the
base. Certainly these flimsy punishments do not match the
seriousness of the crimes these individuals committed.29
No proponent of the act offered examples of unpunished crimes committed by former members of the armed
forces.30

Continuing Focus on Civilian Employees and Dependents
Proponents of this extended jurisdiction have focused and
continue to focus on civilians employed by and accompanying the
armed forces, which is understandable given their longtime routine
presence in military missions. In 1979, the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) reported that, of locations where civilians connected
to the Department of Defense were stationed abroad, several had
“more dependents … stationed there than service members.”31 The
GAO’s report, recommending MEJA-like legislation two decades
before the act came to fruition, opened by stating, “There is virtually
no U.S. civilian or military criminal jurisdiction over the 343,000 U.S.
citizen civilian employees and dependents accompanying the U.S.
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the U.S. Central Command was reporting more than 160,000 civilian contractors by August of 2008.35 Between 2007 and 2008, U.S.
force levels in Afghanistan drastically increased in response to a
strengthening Taliban, by 82 percent from June 2007 to June 2008.36
As noted in the Defense Program Support Reports on contractor
support for DOD operations, the number of contractors working in
Afghanistan significantly increased along with the U.S. force levels.37 In November, 2008, when Department of Defense operations
were ongoing in Iraq and operations in Afghanistan were rapidly
increasing, the civilian contractor workforce was at 266,678.38 The
Department of Defense had been “criticized for its contracting practices in Iraq, and the accounting of contractor personnel in particular.”39 The U.S. Central Command reported efforts to improve oversight and accountability for civilian contractors, including a memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding first
responses to allegations that contractors had committed or were the
victims of crimes.40 In a 2009 article written after his deployment
to Iraq, Lt. Col. Charles T. Kirchmaier noted, “The sheer number
of contractors living and working on the battlefield alongside our
nation’s armed forces suggests that civilian misconduct incidents
will likely occur during the course of a unit’s deployment.”41
While the number of DOD civilian contractors overseas has
been steadily declining since 2008, the percentage of civilians in
the United States’ deployed force remains significant—enough of a
presence to justify vigorous enforcement of extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction over civilians. In 2011, 52 percent of the Department
of Defense workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan was made up of
civilian contractors.42 In January 2014, the Department of Defense
reported a total of 99,057 contractors overseas.43 Most of the contractors were in Afghanistan, and the total number of contractors
had dropped 27 percent from January 2013, and 35 percent from
January 2012.44 The ratio of contractors to military in Afghanistan
had increased to 1.46-to-1 by January 2014.
Between 2005 and 2009, the Department of Defense had
referred 100 cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be prosecuted
under MEJA.45 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the pre- and postenactment focus on civilian misconduct, DOD statistics in late 2009
showed only 7 of those 100 cases involved former members of the
armed forces; the U.S. Attorney’s Office had declined to charge
or prosecute four of those seven referrals, only one referral was

Criminal Jurisdiction continued on page 77

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION continued from page 16
reported to have resulted in charges or prosecution, and the other
referrals were still pending.46 The DOJ reported eight total convictions under MEJA since its enactment, including one of a former
Army private indicted after discharge.47

Noteworthy Prosecutions of Former Armed Forces
In fact, in 2008 and 2009, the DOJ tried two former service
members. One trial ended in acquittal and caused many to publically
question MEJA’s reach over former members of the armed forces.48
The other ended in one of the eight MEJA convictions and was
lauded as justifying the act’s reach.
In November 2006, former Army Private Steven Dale Green was
indicted in the Western District of Kentucky on 17 counts, including
conspiracy, first-degree murder, felony murder, aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, and firearms offenses.49 Green had enlisted at the

the indictment in part because Nazario’s alleged conduct occurred
during combat, something a lay jury would have a difficult time
evaluating.59 The defense team moved for judgment of acquittal,
arguing that the absence of physical evidence was “striking.” “Most
notably, the government has not produced any corpses, photos of
the deceased, or autopsy reports,” the defense argued.60 On Aug. 28,
2008, the civilian jury found Nazario not guilty on all counts.61 Jurors
reportedly struggled with the complexity of military operations and
the task of judging combat actions, calling its role in the case unfair
and “a nightmare.”62
Eight months later, a civilian jury found former Army Private
Green guilty on all counts.63
Encouraged by the conviction of former Private Green and
unfazed by the acquittal of Nazario, Assistant Attorney General Lanny
Breuer testified in 2011 before the Senate Judiciary Committee

Both factually and mathematically, Santiago’s conviction could be seen as exceptional, an
anomaly. He is one of only three former service members charged and fully prosecuted under
MEJA, and he was the only one of those three whose conduct was actually discovered by a
commander and fully investigated while he was still a member of the armed forces.
age of 19 and deployed to Iraq in September 2005, stationed near
Mahmoudiya, south of Baghdad.50 By December, Green had reported to a combat stress team that he “wanted to kill all Iraqis,” and
he had been prescribed antipsychotic medication.51 In March 2006,
Green and three other soldiers stationed at the same traffic check
point walked to a nearby house intending to rape a 14-year-old Iraqi
girl they had seen living there. They killed the girl’s family and raped
and killed her, burning her body and the home after the crime.
Green confessed to his involvement in the crimes shortly after the
bodies were discovered, but evidence showed the noncommissioned
officer who heard his confession did not report it to the company
commander.52 While the initial investigative team blamed the killings
on Iraqi counterinsurgents, the soldiers’ involvement was uncovered
on June 20 during a combat stress counseling session with another
soldier. FBI agents arrested Green on June 30, 2006.53 Green had
been discharged 45 days earlier, cutting off the military’s jurisdiction to prosecute him under the UCMJ.54 The U.S. Attorney’s Office
asserted that MEJA “was specifically enacted to prevent the absurdity of allowing people like [Green] to escape any prosecution solely
because they happened to have been discharged from the service
before their criminal conduct was uncovered.”55
Before Green’s case went to trial, the DOJ indicted and tried
another former member of the armed forces, Marine Sergeant
Jose Nazario. In June 2007, Nazario was charged under MEJA with
involuntary manslaughter, assault with a dangerous weapon, and
firearms charges, all related to conduct committed in a 2004 military
operation in Fallujah, Iraq.56 The indictment alleged that Nazario
and other Marines shot and killed four Iraqis they had detained
during a firefight in the second battle of Fallujah on Nov. 9, 2004.57
Nazario was discharged from the Marines in October 2005 and
decorated for valor in connection with his actions during Fallujah
battles.58 Defense counsel argued that the court should dismiss

that his office—the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special
Prosecutions Section—had been “aggressively” enforcing MEJA.
“We have had great success in bringing cases under MEJA, and are
committed to continuing to enforce MEJA vigorously,” Breuer told
the committee.64 Former Corporal Santiago was indicted in January
2013.

Anomaly or Trend?
Both factually and mathematically, Santiago’s conviction could
be seen as exceptional, an anomaly. He is one of only three former
service members charged and fully prosecuted under MEJA, and
he was the only one of those three whose conduct was actually
discovered by a commander and fully investigated while he was still
a member of the armed forces. After Judge McMahon’s scathing
criticism of the use of MEJA against a former service member whose
criminal conduct was fully known before he was discharged, the current version of the act may not be long for this world.
Section 3261(d) could be modified to prohibit use of the act
against a former member of the armed forces unless the service
member ceases to be subject to the UCMJ and the service member’s
conduct that would constitute an offense was not actually discovered by a commander while he or she was still subject to the UCMJ.
The frustration Judge McMahon expressed with the bureaucratic
inner workings of the Marine Corps legal community suggests an
amendment could go even further, beyond conduct “not actually
discovered” to include conduct that “should not have been actually
discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.”
Either modification could result in complicated inquiries focusing on conversations, reports, and evidence available only on foreign
soil, often in a theater of war. As Breuer testified, even the current
requirement that a non-DOD employee’s work relate to “supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas” results in
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complex investigations that can become “extremely challenging and
resource-intensive.”65 Yet, either modification would better ensure
the act is used only when conduct truly does not surface until after
discharge from the military.
The irregularity of Santiago’s prosecution is also what makes it
significant—the attention Judge McMahon has drawn to the use
of MEJA against former members of the armed forces should be
important not only to the military legal community and federal
prosecutors, but also to the growing force of advocates representing
recently returned veterans.
A veteran’s advocate typically focuses on a veteran’s character
of discharge for how it impacts his or her access to health care and
eligibility for benefits. An honorably discharged veteran has a wealth
of options available, in contrast to a veteran with “bad papers,” who
has a more difficult road to obtaining treatment and compensation
for injuries or diseases incurred in service. To the extent a veteran’s
advocate explores an honorably discharged veteran’s conduct
committed overseas, it is usually to understand how the veteran’s
experiences in combat connect to current physical and mental disabilities. But the prosecution of former Corporal Santiago, as well as
other former members of the armed forces, stands as a warning to
broaden our awareness beyond substantiating eligibility for benefits
and services. Until the act is modified, advocates must be aware
that recently returned veterans—even those receiving honorable
discharges—may be prosecuted in civilian courts for in-service conduct committed while in uniform overseas.66 
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